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COMPLETE JUSTICE: UPHOLDING THE
PRINCIPLES OF TITLE VII THROUGH
APPROPRIATE TREATMENT OF
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
Jennifer Miyoko Follette
Abstract: Congress enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to combat employ-
ment discrimination and to provide relief to discrimination victims. The 1972 and 1991
amendments strengthened the statute and delineated a clear congressional commitment to
the statute's purposes. In most cases the courts have utilized the statutes remedial provi-
sions to deter further discriminatory conduct and to provide relief to victims. However,
the majority of federal circuit courts which have addressed the issue deny a remedy to
plaintiffs in cases where an employer discovers evidence of an employee's misrepresenta-
tions on a resume or evidence of misconduct on the job after the discriminatory action.
This Comment critically examines the majority view and concludes that using after-
acquired evidence to withhold all remedies violates the purposes of Title VII and misap-
plies equitable principles. This Comment also urges the courts to follow the EEOC guide-
lines regarding use of after-acquired evidence and offers a proposal for treatment of after-
acquired evidence under Title VII.
When employers discriminate against their employees in the work-
place, the victims have the right to take their employers to court.
Some courts, however, have ruled that employers may escape liability
for their discriminatory behavior because of actions totally unrelated
to the employers' conduct. Of the five circuits which have addressed
this issue, four have concluded that if an employer, after the discrimi-
nation occurred, uncovers evidence that the employee lied on a resume
or was guilty of on-the-job misconduct, they will use such evidence to
nullify the plaintiff's right to relief. This majority view effectively
exonerates a culpable employer for Title VII violations regardless of
the evidence's lack of causal relevance to the discrimination claim and
in spite of the fact that the discrimination occurred prior to the discov-
ery of the evidence.
This Comment argues that using after-acquired evidence to bar
relief under Title VII is erroneous. A total bar to recovery undermines
the purposes of the statute and is inconsistent with the rules of equity.
The discussion will begin with an examination of Title VII, its pur-
poses, its remedies, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). Part II will survey the federal courts' treatment of
after-acquired evidence in cases brought under Title VII. This review
will lead into an explanation in part III of why the majority approach
is incorrect. Finally, part IV will offer a proposal for treatment of
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after-acquired evidence which is consistent with Title VII's purposes,
language, and principles.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.I The statute not only outlaws disparate treatment
of individuals and groups, it also outlaws employment systems which
disparately impact minority employees.2 Furthermore, Title VII cre-
ates a personal right in the victim to sue the discriminating employer
in federal court. The original 1964 legislation and the subsequent
amendments in 1972 and 1991 reflect the increasing congressional
commitment to a national policy against discrimination. The policy,
clearly supported in the purposes and remedies of Title VII and the
establishment of the EEOC, embodies both a deterrent goal of elimi-
nating discrimination in the workplace and a remedial goal of provid-
ing relief to discrimination victims.
A. Purposes of Title VII
The courts have consistently and clearly found both deterrent and
remedial purposes behind Title VII in the legislative history and the
statute's language.4 According to the Supreme Court, Congress
intended Title VII to promote equality in employment and eliminate
barriers that previously acted to limit opportunities for minority
employees.5 Moreover, the statute aims to make victims of discrimi-
nation whole through appropriate equitable awards. 6 To accomplish
this "make-whole" purpose, the statute directs the courts to restore
plaintiffs, as best as possible, to the positions they would have occu-
pied absent the unlawful discrimination. 7 In 1991, Congress rein-
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1981). Years of effort to pass regulations regarding
discriminatory private employment practices culminated in the passage of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. For a more detailed history of the 1964 Title VII, see UNITED STATES EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TrrLES VII AND XI OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 1-11 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. The employee acquires the right to sue in federal court after an informal administrative
processing by the EEOC. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
4. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
5. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
6. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972)).
7. Id.
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forced the established purposes of Title VII and added the new specific
purpose of eradicating harassment in the workplace.8
B. Remedies Under Title VII
From the Act's inception, Congress has expected the courts to fash-
ion relief consistent with the goals of Title VII to eradicate discrimina-
tion and make plaintiffs whole.9 Congress has twice expanded the
remedy provisions of Title VII to facilitate these goals. In 1972, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act broadened the courts' power to
award equitable remedies and extended coverage to public employers.
In 1991, the latest Civil Rights Act added the possibility of compensa-
tory and punitive damages.
L 1964 Remedies
Section 706(g) of the 1964 Act permits the courts to award remedies
in order to deter and eradicate discrimination. 10 This section grants
the federal courts power to enjoin defendants engaged in unlawful
employment practices and to order appropriate affirmative relief."x
Affirmative relief under the 1964 Act includes reinstatement, hiring,
and injunctions with or without an award of backpay"2 and attorney's
fees. 13
8. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The bill's sponsors initially
intended to reaffirm the principles of Title VII and to overturn a number of 1989 Supreme Court
decisions which narrowed the scope of Title VII. As the bill progressed through Congress,
however, the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings affected the Act's development. The focus
of debate increasingly centered on sexual harassment and the lack of federal remedies for such
claims. Because of the heightened public awareness of sexual harassment which developed out of
the hearings, commentators regard the possible negative impact of a presidential veto on George
Bush's reelection campaign as a primary inducement for the Act's passage. See Timothy D.
Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71
NEB. L. REv. 304, 304-07 (1992).
9. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (West Supp. 1992).
11. Id.
12. Backpay is the total economic compensation the individual would have earned, subject to
standard mitigation requirements, from the date the individual is denied a position or discharged
to the date of a court decree awarding the position or reinstatement. Significantly, the courts
have found that backpay includes the loss of fringe benefits, commissions, cost of living expenses,
tips, vacation leave, and sick leave. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1440-41 (2d ed. 1983). In addition to the backpay
remedy, courts have awarded frontpay when it is not feasible to reinstate employees to their
former positions because of extreme hostility or when no position is immediately available. See
id. at 203-04 (2d ed. Supp. 1987-1989).
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(l), (k) (West Supp. 1992).
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2. The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act
The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Azt expanded the
courts' power to provide equitable awards and explicitly verified the
principle that the courts must attempt to make plairtiffs whole. Con-
gress amended section 706(g) to provide not only injunctions and
affirmative relief, but also "any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate."14 Consequently, this catch-all phrase directed
the courts to be more flexible in fashioning relief and to consider a
wider variety of remedies."i
The Supreme Court responded to the 1972 Act by declaring that
judicially limiting remedies under Title VII is permissible only if it
does not frustrate the central purposes of eradicatirg discrimination
and making persons whole for injuries suffered. 6 Although the statu-
tory language repeatedly uses the word "may,"17 the Court consist-
ently ruled that Title VII remedies presumptively iaclude a backpay
award."8 Despite the discretion involved in awarding equitable relief,
the Supreme Court held that courts must exercise their powers "in
light of the large objectives of the Act."1 9 The grant of equitable pow-
ers in a complex legislative scheme, the Court explained, mandates
that remedies fairly reflect the purposes of the statute.20 Therefore, a
court administering Title VII must attempt to render "complete jus-
tice" 21 and create the most comprehensive relief possible.22 Drawing
on the idea of complete justice and supported by the new language in
14. Id.
15. Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VI1 Back Pay
Remedy, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1301, 1325-26 (1990).
16. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976).
17. Section 706(g) reads:
[T"he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. . ., or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
18. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (asserting that authority for partial denial of backpay
"must be as narrowly constrained as authority to totally deny; its exercise, therefore, must be
supported by reasons faithful to the dual purpose attributed to the iackpay remedy by the
Albemarle court"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
19. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 416 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)); see
supra part I.A.
20. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 416-17.
21. Id. at 418.
22. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976) (stating that Title VII requires
that remedies ensure that "persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of unlawful
employment be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not
for the unlawful discrimination") (citing the section-by-section analysis of House Report 1746
654
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the 1972 Act, the courts became more comfortable awarding equitable
relief other than backpay after the 1972 amendments. Other equitable
remedies awarded include expunging personnel records,23 granting
tenure, and awarding promotions.24
3. The 1991 Amendments
The 1991 amendments to Title VII greatly expanded the ability of
the courts to make victims of discrimination whole. Section 102 of the
1991 amendments entitles plaintiffs to recover compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional discrimination.25 The section also
grants the right to a jury trial at the request of either party if plaintiffs
seek compensatory or punitive damages.26 Moreover, the amend-
ments clarify that defendants cannot avoid liability under Title VII
even if a discriminatory basis is only one of several factors in an
adverse employment decision. 27  As a result, the amendments
strengthen plaintiffs' claims for relief and provide remedies for previ-
ously unrecoverable injuries. The additional remedies not only reflect
the continuing congressional belief in the principles of Title VII; they
also reflect the gradual development and societal commitment to the
national policy against discrimination.28
accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 CONG.
REC. 7166, 7168 (1972)).
23. Mead v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114 (D. Mirn. 1977).
24. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 1397.
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073. The
additional damages provisions of Title VII appear in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 rather than as an
amendment to Title VII.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
28. Section 2 of the Act states that "[t]he Congress finds that-(1) additional remedies under
Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace;... (3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat.
1071. This language also has sparked a debate over the question of the Act's retroactivity. The
Act never conclusively resolves whether or not it has retroactive effect. Because the term
"additional" may signify a substantive change in the law, employers contend that this section
supports the argument that the courts apply the Act only prospectively. See Niall A. Paul, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Really Accomplish?, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 567, 586-88
(1992) (discussing the dilemma surrounding the effective date and application of the 1991
amendments).
The Supreme Court will rule on the issue of retroactivity in the Fall Term of 1993. The two
cases are Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3787 (1993), and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cerL granted,
113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993).
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Z Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Prior to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, backpay and an occa-
sional award of frontpay were the only monetary remedies available to
victims of discrimination.29 The courts regularly interpreted the stat-
ute's 1972 amendment, which provided for "any other equitable
relief," as a bar to legal damages.3" Thus, except for a few early
cases,31 the courts refused to allow compensatory or punitive
recovery.32
Many critics argued that the pre-1991 restrictions on Title VII dam-
ages acted as an insufficient deterrent and failed to make victims
whole." Because the courts considered recovery under Title VII as
exclusively equitable, plaintiffs could not receive monetary damages
for non-economic injuries. For example, plaintiffs who proved dis-
crimination in the form of a hostile work environment or harassment
could receive no monetary recovery unless they could also show a job-
related economic injury. Because damages for humiliation, mental
distress, and other emotional or even physical aspects of harassment
were limited to equitable relief, they were effectively unrecoverable.
Moreover, the mitigation requirements of Title VII 4 further discour-
aged plaintiffs with legitimate grievances from taking action against
liable employers. If the plaintiff immediately found a better paying
job, the mandatory reduction of the possible award by interim earn-
ings rendered the claim monetarily insignificant. The insubstantial
monetary awards also failed to encourage employers to voluntarily
reform their discriminatory practices.
29. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting Title VII is
limited to backpay), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105
Stat. 1071, 1072; see also United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (noting that remedies
under pre-1991 Title VII were economic in nature and therefore taxable as gross income under
the Internal Revenue Code).
30. The phrase "equitable remedies" is a term of art which in modern times serves to
characterize damages in order to determine whether or not a case merits a jury trial. The
Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial if an individual s legal rights are at stake,
but not if only equitable damages are at stake. Thus, until 1991, Title VII claims were not tried
before a jury. See, eg., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that backpay was not in nature a claim for damages but an integral part of Title
VII equitable remedies).
31. See, eg., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd sub
nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975) (awarding punitive damages),
vacated sub nom. Utility Workers Union v. EEOC, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
32. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 1452.
33. See Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1306-09, 1309 n.32.
34. The courts will offset a backpay award by "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
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The 1991 amendments partially eliminated these limitations. Under
these new amendments, plaintiffs may recover compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional discrimination.a5 Compensation can
include damages for pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, emotional distress, and humiliation.36 And, if the discrimina-
tion is sufficiently egregious, the claim may also merit punitive dam-
ages.37 The 1991 amendments thereby granted the courts a greater
ability to administer the dual purposes of Title VII: to eradicate dis-
crimination in the workplace and to make victims of discrimination
whole.38
Suits brought under Title VII will undoubtedly multiply on account
of the additional remedies. The additional remedies significantly
increase the potential recovery and may encourage plaintiffs to pursue
previously negligible claims.39 As a result, the amendments force
employers to heighten their awareness of discrimination. The amend-
ments also create a stronger likelihood that employers will reevaluate
and reform their employment practices. Furthermore, the amend-
ments extend Title VII's ability to make victims whole. This relief is
particularly pertinent to harassment victims. Because most harass-
ment claims involve intentional discrimination but may not include
economic injuries, compensation awards and punitive damages create
a remedy for previously insignificant claims."
35. Id. § 198la(a)(1).
36. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
37. A plaintiff may receive punitive damages if the employer "engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Id. § 198la(b)(1). Although compensatory and
punitive damages are still unavailable if the plaintiff cannot show intent, at least one
commentator predicts that "the 'reckless indifference' standard will implicate virtually every case
involving allegations of intentional discrimination." Loudon, supra note 8, at 311.
38. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
39. Commentators consider the 1991 amendments to be a significant victory for plaintiffs. In
addition to the new remedies, the provision in section 102(c) of the Act which allows for a trial
by jury at the request of either party when plaintiffs seek compensation or punitive damages will
greatly increase the likelihood of plaintiffs' victories. See Loudon, supra note 8, at 312.
Compensatory and punitive damages under section 102(b)(3) are capped at $50,000 to $300,000
depending on employer size. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat.
1071, 1073.
40. The coverage will have the greatest effect in states that do not currently provide state law
protection for discrimination comparable to Title VII. David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAw 33 (6th ed. 1992).
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ii Mixed-Motive Cases
The 1991 amendments also addressed mixed-motive cases in
response to the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.4  Mixed-motive cases are instances where both legitimate
and illegitimate factors motivate an employment decision. In Price
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court created a burden-shifting rule for
mixed-motive cases. The rule required that a plaintiff first establish a
discriminatory motive under Title VII. g2 Then, if the plaintiff met the
burden, the burden of proof would shift to the defendant to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same deci-
sion in the absence of discrimination.43 If the defendant carried this
burden, the defendant would be absolved of liability." Congress dis-
agreed with the Court's holding that a legitimate motive for an other-
wise discriminatory action could relieve a defendant from Title VII
liability. It responded with the enactment of the 1991 amendments;
legislatively overruling the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting rule in
mixed-motive cases.45
The 1991 amendments clarify that a legitimate motive, even if
known by the employer at the time of the discriminatory action, will
not excuse a defendant from Title VII liability. Similarly, the legiti-
mate motive will not destroy a plaintiff's right to receive damages for
discriminatory conduct. Under section 107(a), evidence showing that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a "motivating factor"
for an adverse employment decision will conclusively establish an
unlawful employment practice.46 The courts may not weigh other
motivating factors in order to justify a complete denial of Title VII
recovery. At the minimum, the plaintiff is entitled to declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs for pursuing the
claim.47
41. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
42. Id. at 244.
43. Id at 252-53.
44. Id. at 258. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court noted that "Title VII meant to
condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations."
Id. at 241. However, the Court held that it was not enough that an employee could prove that
gender played a part in an employment decision. Id. at 258.
45. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: C.ngressional Response to
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 425 (1992).
46. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
47. Id. at 1075-76.
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C. The Role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In Title VII, Congress also created an administrative agency, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to promote the
goals of the statute.48 The EEOC had no enforcement powers for its
first seven years and only served to process charges, conduct investiga-
tions and educational programs, and issue guidelines interpreting Title
VII.4 9 Although the EEOC guidelines do not have the force and effect
of law,50 the Supreme Court has held that the guidelines are generally
entitled to deference as an administrative interpretation of the Act."1
In 1972, Congress transformed the EEOC into a law-enforcement
agency by passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA).52
The EEOA strengthened the EEOC and empowered it to initiate liti-
gation against violators 3 and intervene in private litigation5" in order
to deter discriminatory behavior.
Title VII grants the EEOC a central role in bringing justice to vic-
tis of discrimination. Before the plaintiff may fie a claim in federal
court, the plaintiff must file a written complaint with the EEOC and
the appropriate state agencies.55 The EEOC will investigate the
charge in order to determine if there is "reasonable cause" to believe
that illegal discrimination occurred. 6 If the EEOC finds reasonable
cause, the agency will attempt to eliminate the discrimination through
informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.17 If con-
ciliation fails, the EEOC may bring an action in federal district
court.5 If the EEOC dismisses the charge, or fails to act within 180
48. In administrating the law, the EEOC is authorized by law to "issue, amend, or rescind
suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of (Title VII)." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
12(a) (West 1981).
49. Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 7, 81-82
(1977).
50. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
51. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)); cf EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235
(1991) (stating that validity of guidelines depends on the thoroughness evident in their
consideration, their reasoning, their consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
other factors which give guidelines power to persuade) (citing General Elec., 429 U.S. at 141);
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (holding that guidelines need
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference).
52. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 104 (1972).
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 1981).
54. Id. § 200oe-4(g)(6).
55. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 20ooe-5(0(1).
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days after filing, the plaintiff has 90 days to bring a personal action in
federal district court. 59
II. THREE APPROACHES TO AFTER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE
Despite statutory attempts to eliminate employment discrimination
and make plaintiffs whole through remedial awards, the federal appel-
late courts differ in their rules for determining the effect that after-
acquired evidence will have on a plaintiff's claim for relief under Title
VII. After-acquired evidence is unfavorable evidence about the
employee that the employer discovers after the discriminatory act
occurs. For example, if an employer discriminates against an
employee because of sex and race but later discovers that the employee
lied about receiving a college degree in the original employment appli-
cation, proof of the lie is after-acquired evidence.' The majority view,
which four of the five circuits follow, concludes that after-acquired
evidence can bar a plaintiff's right to recovery. The minority view, on
the other hand, does not permit after-acquired evidence to serve as an
affirmative defense to Title VII liability. Under the minority view, the
courts will allow some forms of Title VII recovery to victims of dis-
crimination regardless of the after-acquired evidence assembled
against the plaintiff. The EEOC guidelines support -the minority view.
A. The Majority View
The majority view disregards culpable discrimination once the
defendant proves that after-acquired evidence of the plaintiff's misrep-
resentations or misconduct would be material in either circumstances
of hiring or firing.6 1 The majority rule reasons that if employers had
known of the material evidence they would not have hired or would
have terminated the plaintiff.62 Thus, the discrimination cannot
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
61. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992) (granting
summary judgment for defendant based on after-acquired evidence of plaintiff's driving under
the influence conviction prior to employment when evidence would have resulted in immediate
termination), petition for cert filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1993) (No. 92-1214);
Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992) (granting summary judgment for
defendant where after-acquired evidence would have resulted in immediate termination if known
to the employer); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming
directed verdict for defendant under Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act where employer
relied upon plaintiff's application misrepresentation in making the hiring decision).
62. See, e.g., Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 304.
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legally damage the plaintiff in after-acquired evidence cases.63
Although the evidence does not affect the defendant's culpability, the
courts allow the evidence to affect the availability of a remedy." The
courts reason that if the evidence materially affects the plaintiff's posi-
tion as an employee, then the plaintiff no longer has the right to
recover as an employee.65 If the plaintiff has no remedy, the claim
merits dismissal.
For example, in Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univer-
sity, 66 the plaintiff was fired for filing a claim with the EEOC alleging
sexual discrimination on the job. The trial court found that the
employer was guilty of discrimination. The court of appeals, however,
ruled that the discrimination issue became irrelevant as a result of the
after-acquired evidence. 67 The court barred recovery based on evi-
dence that the plaintiff had a driving under the influence (DUI) con-
viction five years prior to being hired by the defendant and that
discovery of the conviction during the course of employment would
have resulted in immediate termination.68 Even though the previous
DUI conviction and the subsequent discriminatory conduct were
wholly unrelated, the evidence barred relief for the plaintiff and
allowed the defendant to avoid penalty. The total effect of this rule, in
addition to leaving many victims without a remedy, is that many
defendants escape scot-free.
Courts often refer to the majority approach as the Summers rule
because decisions following this approach frequently cite a hypotheti-
cal scenario first introduced in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. 69 The Summers court analogized after-acquired
evidence cases to a hypothetical in which a company doctor alleges
violations of Title VII due to age, race, religion, and sex.70 If the
employer discovers after the discriminatory conduct that the plaintiff
was not, in fact, a doctor, then the "masquerading" plaintiff would not
be entitled to relief.71
The majority approach implicitly applies the unclean hands doc-
trine in after-acquired evidence cases. The unclean hands doctrine is
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 975 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1992), petition for cert filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1993)
(No. 92-1214).
67. Id at 305.
68. Id. at 303.
69. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
70. Id. at 708.
71. Id.
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an affirmative defense in equity which allows courts to balance the
equities and consider whether plaintiff's own conduct should bar or
reduce an award.72 The approach of the courts applying the majority
rule satisfies this definition; these courts use their equitable powers to
eliminate a plaintiff's claim for relief based on the plaintiff's own dis-
honesty or misconduct.
B. The Minority View
The minority view refuses to permit evidence regarding the plaintiff
acquired after the discriminatory act to completely eliminate recov-
ery.7 3 The minority approach rejects the majority rule as adverse to
the purposes of Title VII.7 A rule which allows employers to escape
liability on grounds totally unrelated to the alleged discrimination
does not encourage employers to eliminate discrimination." The
minority approach contends that the majority rule will invite employ-
ers to establish low thresholds for legitimate termination and rum-
mage through unlawfully-discharged employees' background for
damaging information." Thus, the rule actually encourages employ-
ers to search through the employees' past for any evidence that would
convince the court that an employee is unworthy of relief.7 7 Employ-
ers can then use this damaging information to manufacture a legiti-
mate motive for discharge.7 8 More disturbing to the minority view is
the possibility that employers with a proclivity towards unlawful
employment practices will "sandbag" employees,75' especially in sex
discrimination cases. Consequently, the minority view concludes that
after-acquired evidence should only affect the prospective remedies of
reinstatement, frontpay, and injunctive relief.8"
72. DAN P. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY,
RESTITUTION § 2.4 (1973).
73. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (1lth Cir. 1992) ,refusing to permit after-
acquired evidence of material misstatements to serve as an aTfirmative defense to a discrimination
claim).
74. Id. at 1180.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id
78. Id
79. "Sandbagging" occurs when an employer hires employees, despite knowledge of
legitimate motives to not hire them, destroys any evidence of such knowledge, pays them less,
discriminates until an employee protests, and then "discovers" the legitimate motive during the
ensuing litigation. Under the majority view, the employer will escape any liability for this
egregious treatment. Id. at 1180-81.
80. Id. at 1183.
662
Vol. 68:651, 1993
Title VII and After-Acquired Evidence
C. The EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC guidelines issued on July 14, 1992, support the minority
view."1 If the employer produces proof of a legitimate reason to termi-
nate the employee, discovered after the discriminatory action, the
EEOC suggests action similar to that taken in mixed-motive cases.82
The EEOC guidelines do not require the employer to reinstate the
employee.8" However, the employee would be entitled to receive
backpay until the date that the employee's misconduct or misrepresen-
tation was discovered and, for post-1991 employer conduct, the
employee would also be entitled to compensatory damages until the
date of discovery. 4 Furthermore, in after-acquired evidence cases the
employer will be subject to punitive damages if the employer's conduct
occurs after 1991 and the conduct was sufficiently egregious to merit
recovery under section 107 of the 1991 amendments.8 5 The EEOC
guidelines do not allow the employer to use after-acquired evidence to
eliminate any legal injury to the employee.8 6
III. THE MAJORITY VIEW MISAPPLIES TITLE VII IN
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE CASES
The majority approach to after-acquired evidence misconstrues
Title VII in five ways. First, the majority view does not deter or eradi-
cate discriminatory employment practices. Second, the approach does
not make the victim of discrimination whole. Third, the majority view
unjustifiably applies the unclean hands doctrine. Fourth, the majority
view contradicts the guidelines outlined by the EEOC. And finally,
the majority approach contradicts the intent of the 1991 amendments.
A. The Majority View Does Not Deter or Eradicate Discriminatory
Employment Practices
In contrast to the earliest stated purpose of Title VII,87 the majority
view fails to encourage employers to rectify their discriminatory
behavior. The majority view permits evidence unrelated to the dis-
crimination, discovered after the discriminatory conduct, to bar
relief.88 By denying relief to plaintiffs, courts fail to penalize employ-
81. EEOC Decision No. 915-002, 1992 WL 189088 (E.E.O.C.) (July 14, 1992).
82. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
83. EEOC Decision No. 915-002, supra note 81, at 9.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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ers for illegal conduct. Without penalties for illegal employment
actions, these employers have no incentive to alter their behavior.
Remedial awards force noncompliant employers to evaluate their
employment practices and to eradicate discrimination. 9 Courts have
long recognized that employers, in order to reject dubious employ-
ment practices, must face more than a prospect of an injunctive
order.90 An employer who may disagree with the national policy will
nonetheless make appropriate accommodations if faced with economic
penalties. The 1991 amendments reinforced this principle by increas-
ing the potential financial penalties in order to deter continuing dis-
criminatory behavior.9"
B. The Majority View Does Not Make the Victim Whole
In addition to violating the first purpose of the statute, the majority
rule also disregards the second principle of Title VII. The Supreme
Court has clearly stated that Title VII intends to make victims of
unlawful discrimination whole by returning them to the point at which
they would have been, absent the discrimination.92 Contrary to this
purpose, the majority approach places plaintiffs where they would
have been if their employers had known of the after-acquired evidence
prior to the discrimination. The majority approach creates a revision-
ist history of events that allows employers to benefit from information
they did not possess at the time of their culpable conduct. This rule
unfairly grants employers a windfall while plaintiffis, despite the fact
that they would conceivably still be employed without their employ-
ers' discriminatory conduct, suffer disproportionately.
Allowing after-acquired evidence related only to the plaintiff's posi-
tion as an employee and unrelated to the discrimination charge to nul-
lify any relief implies that the employee must have a right to the job in
order to suffer an injury. This is incorrect. Title VII does not require
that an employee have a property right in the job.93 Title VII forbids
discrimination against "individuals," not employees. 94 This distinc-
tion is significant. The statute includes not only those actually
employed, but also applicants and others whose status as a potential
89. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (citing United States v.
N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
90. See id. at 417.
91. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
93. Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that focusing on
whether the applicant would have been hired is an unjustified importation of "property right"
concepts into employment discrimination law).
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (West 1981).
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employee might suffer adverse effects as a result of an employer's dis-
criminatory action. Thus, the courts should not use after-acquired
evidence unrelated to the discrimination charge to eliminate available
Title VII remedies.
C. The Majority View Misapplies the Unclean Hands Doctrine to
Title VII
The unclean hands doctrine also should not completely bar recovery
in after-acquired evidence cases. The doctrine is inapplicable for two
reasons. First, the after-acquired evidence and the discrimination are
not causally related. Second, the doctrine is inapplicable when a
national policy such as that embodied in Title VII overrides the partic-
ular equities between the plaintiff and the defendant.
In after-acquired evidence cases an insufficient causal nexus exists to
invoke the unclean hands doctrine. The unclean hands doctrine is not
a license to destroy the rights of a person whose conduct is unethical.95
A plaintiff's inequitable conduct must be directly related to the plain-
tiff's claim.9 6 In after-acquired evidence cases, the plaintiff asserts a
claim for relief from discrimination. By definition, however, the after-
acquired evidence of the plaintiff's inequitable conduct bears no rela-
tion to the discriminatory behavior. The after-acquired evidence was
unknown to the employer when the discrimination occurred.97 The
plaintiff's unclean hands concededly may affect the expectation of pro-
spective relief,98 but the plaintiff's behavior does not directly affect the
defendant's culpability.
Moreover, even if the evidence of plaintiff's misconduct is relevant
to the remedy sought, public policy considerations outweigh the
unclean hands defense.99 Where private litigants serve an important
function of enforcing a national policy, the courts have a duty to sus-
tain actions by plaintiffs with unclean hands in order to effectuate the
congressional purpose."°° Even when a blameworthy plaintiff will
95. DOBBS, supra note 72, at 46.
96. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933).
97. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
98. See infra part IV.C.
99. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456, 506 (1927) (stating that
unclean hands cannot be applied to "frustrate the purpose of [the] laws or to thwart public
policy").
100. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) ("We
have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief
where a private suit serves important public purposes."), overruled on other grounds by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (noting that where a civil action serves as a weapon of enforcement, "it is
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unfairly recover a windfall, courts will disregard uknclean hands in
order to promote a larger policy goal.10' Accordingly, in after-
acquired evidence cases the courts must give significant weight to the
public interest behind the statute. The courts must acknowledge the
important role private actions play in enforcing Title VII and deter-
ring future discriminatory conduct. 10 A plaintiff's misrepresentation
or misconduct should not destroy an action for discrimination because
the claim itself, aside from the plaintiff's personal ethics, enforces an
important public policy. 10 3 It is better to remedy a wrong that is
cearly labeled as contrary to public policy, than to leave two wrongs
at large. 104
D. The Majority View Erroneously Disregards the EEOC Guidelines
In after-acquired evidence cases, the majority view clearly contra-
dicts the EEOC guidelines. The EEOC guidelines do not allow unre-
lated after-acquired evidence to destroy a right to relief.105 While the
guidelines do not have the same effect as law, the federal courts cannot
completely disregard the guidelines without enumerating grounds why
deference is unwarranted.0 6 The courts should give great deference to
the guidelines because they are reasonable in light of Title VII's his-
tory and purposes and serve the practical function. of disseminating
uniform information.
Congress created the EEOC to promote and administer Title VII. 107
Congress not only gave the EEOC enforcement powers under the 1972
amendments, but it also afforded defendants a defense under Title VII
the duty of the courts to be alert" to sustain such actions in order "to make effective the
congressional purpose").
101. For example, courts have allowed plaintiffs involved in anticompetitive schemes to bring
antitrust claims against others despite the plaintiffs' culpable conduct. Professional Beauty
Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979); Trebuhs
Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (noting that the
necessity of maintaining free competition overrides the particular equities which might exist
between the immediate parties to the action); see also George E. Murray III, Securities
Regulation-In Pari Delicto as a Bar to Private Antifraud Action by 5ippee Against Tipper, 43
Mo. L. REv. 378, 381 (1978) (arguing that in securities cases, the public policy of preserving the
integrity of the market necessitates maintaining private enforcement actions even if a windfall
may accrue to a culpable plaintiff).
102. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (r=ognizing the important
role Congress gave private individuals in the enforcement process of Title VII).
103. Ia ("[Tihe private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the
important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.").
104. Tube Forgings of Am., Inc. v. Weldbend Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (D. Or. 1992).
105. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
107. See supra part I.C.
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if they can show good faith reliance on an EEOC interpretation."'
Consequently, the evidence demonstrates that Congress intended to
grant the EEOC a central role in interpreting and administering the
statute. The guidelines regarding treatment of after-acquired evidence
are not inconsistent with any previous administrative ruling and they
are consistent with the purposes of Title VII. If the courts do not
defer to reasonable guidelines created by the EEOC, they frustrate the
primary purpose for the Commission's existence. 109
The EEOC has the expertise necessary to more comprehensively
address complex questions and determine appropriate remedies in the
area of employment discrimination. The EEOC has firsthand experi-
ence administering Title VII.O° The EEOC is also better equipped
than the courts to evaluate the complex range of issues that impact the
employment community. 1 ' Moreover, deference to the guidelines
will encourage parties to settle claims before they reach litigation, thus
promoting the EEOC's goal of conciliation.' 1 2 The courts should
therefore defer to the guidelines in fashioning equitable relief.
The guidelines help employers and employees understand the law's
requirements and ramifications. The guidelines are the highest inter-
pretation of the law and create a clear standard to which employers
should look for direction. Clear expectations create less confusion
and, if accepted as controlling in the courts, will allow the EEOC to
serve its statutory function more effectively. In fact, with the passage
of the 1991 amendments, uncertainty regarding the amendments'
effects will undoubtedly arise. Rather than wait until the courts deter-
mine what the 1991 amendments mean for the working world, the
EEOC should be afforded the flexibility to create uniform guidelines
which reflect changing conditions and laws.
E. The Majority View Contradicts the Intent of the 1991
Amendments
The majority view contradicts the 1991 amendments which estab-
lish congressional intent to provide relief to all proven discrimination
claims under Title VII. The amendment which overruled the mixed-
motive balancing test established in Price Waterhouse confirms that
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12(b) (West 1981).
109. See supra note 48.
110. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
111. See Susan K. Goplen, Note, Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal
Interpretations After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1993) (arguing that
deference to administrative agencies should take preference over stare decisis).
112. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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even in instances where a legitimate motive is known to the employer
at the time of the adverse action, the employee can recover if an illegal
motive also was a motivating factor in the decision.1 3 In after-
acquired evidence cases, the employment decision is motivated
entirely by discrimination."' The employer does not have any legiti-
mate motives at the time of the discriminatory action. If a known
legitimate basis for an adverse employment action does not eliminate
remedies under Title VII, surely an unknown legitimate basis also
should not eliminate remedies. Clearly, therefore, a rule which allows
a legitimate motive discovered after the discrimination occurs to com-
pletely eliminate a plaintiff's claim is inconsistent dth the amended
statute.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR TREATMENT OF
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
The courts should underscore an employee's Title VII claim by
treating an employer's unlawful discrimination and the after-acquired
evidence as two causally and temporally distinct issues. Once a plain-
tiff establishes liability, the courts should always award backpay and a
reasonable attorney's fee. The defendant should be required to prove
that the after-acquired evidence would be material to a termination
decision. Finally, such evidence should only eliminate prospective
relief.
A. Courts Should Always Award Backpay for the Feriod Between
the Discriminatory Act and the Discovery of the Material
Evidence
Courts should always award backpay to successful plaintiffs in after-
acquired evidence cases. A central aim of the statute is to make plain-
tiffs whole."' Backpay forces an employer to account for wages and
other benefits that employees would have otherwise earned had the
discrimination not taken place." 6 Because an employee would have
been employed, absent any discrimination, until the after-acquired evi-
113. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
114. Mixed-motive cases are analogous to after-acquired evidence cases because both involve
the weighing of legitimate and illegitimate factors in determining an amount of damages. They
can be distinguished from after-acquired evidence cases, however, in that in the latter case the
legitimate motive cannot have "caused" the adverse employment action because, unlike mixed-
motive situations, the employer does not have any knowledge of the information at the time of
the action.
115. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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dence was eventually discovered, the backpay award should at the
very least span from the point of discrimination to the point of discov-
ery. Even if the fraud is material and the employee is unqualified for
the position held, the courts should award a reasonable attorney's fee
and backpay, subject to the usual offsetting and mitigation provisions,
up to the time of defendant's discovery of the falsification.
Moreover, if the claim merits, the plaintiff should recover compen-
satory and punitive damages. 117 Compensatory damages for non-eco-
nomic injuries have no relationship to the after-acquired evidence and
are necessary to make the victims whole. Punitive damages also have
no relationship to the after-acquired evidence and should be awarded,
not to make the victim whole, but to discourage employers from con-
tinuing their discriminatory employment practices.
B. Courts Should Place the Burden of Proof on the Defendant to
Show that the Falsification Would be Material at the Time
It Was Discovered
If the plaintiff proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the bur-
den of proof should shift to the defendant to show that the after-
acquired evidence is material. Evidence would be material if, in a neu-
tral situation, it would result in the plaintiff's immediate termination.
Not all evidence of misrepresentations or misconduct would compel
the employer to discharge the employee. For example, situations exist
where evidence of resume fraud may not merit firing the employee
even though the employer may not have hired a person who commit-
ted such fraud. The employer may have invested training in the
employee and the misrepresentation may be insignificant.118 Thus, the
courts should require that employers prove that information of the
kind discovered would actually affect an employee's status in non-dis-
criminatory circumstances.
C. Material After-Acquired Evidence Should Only Affect Prospective
Relief
If the evidence is not material, the employee is entitled to reinstate-
ment or, if reinstatement is impossible, the employee should receive
frontpay. However, once the employer establishes materiality, the
plaintiff should not receive prospective remedies because the interest of
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b) (West Supp. 1992); see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying
text.
118. See, eg., Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); O'Driscoll v.
Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990).
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the employer in making lawful decisions on non-discriminatory
grounds prevails over the employee's right to any prospective relief.
The law should not require an employer to retain a employee who
would be subject to immediate termination on non-discriminatory
grounds. Title VII does not propose to force an employer to retain an
unqualified worker or to force employment in the face of bona fide
disqualifications. 119 As a result, regardless of the unlawful catalyst
behind the discovery of the evidence, the employer's freedom to make
decisions becomes a factor in forming an equitable remedy.
Discontinuing the plaintiff's remedies from the point the employer
discovered the material evidence makes the plaintiff as whole as possi-
ble without trampling the employer's right to make lawful decisions.
Once the employer discovers the evidence, granting prospective reme-
dies in cases where the employer can prove the evidence is material
would render the plaintiff more than whole. Even though the
employer would conceivably never have discovered the evidence with-
out the discrimination claim, prospective remedies would force
employers to retain unqualified employees. Thus, reinstatement and
frontpay are inappropriate. An injunction against future discrimina-
tion may also be unsuitable since the employee would no longer work
as an employee of the defendant and the discrimination may have been
personal to the victim.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should not allow evidence regarding the unrelated conduct
of plaintiffs to cloud their responsibility to take action against discrim-
inating employers. Allowing after-acquired evidence to preclude a
remedy to plaintiffs under Title VII not only undermines the make-
whole purpose of the Act, it fails to deter employers from continuing
their discriminatory practices. The court's use of such evidence erro-
neously applies the unclean hands doctrine because the culpable con-
duct and such evidence are unrelated and the public policy behind
Title VII outweighs any inequities between individual employers and
employees. Congress explicitly supported this policy in the 1991
amendments by ordering recovery for victims in mixed-motive
cases. 
120
In order to fully effectuate Title VII, the courts should defer to the
EEOC guidelines and issue appropriate forms of equitable and com-
119. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 533 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1011 (1977).
120. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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pensatory relief. In addition, if the discrimination was sufficiently
malicious, the courts should award punitive damages to discourage
future discriminatory conduct. To neglect to do so effectively victim-
izes the plaintiff twice: once, as an employee and again, as a plaintiff
denied equitable relief.
